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ABSTRACT 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks have emerged as a significant social 
phenomenon for the distribution of information goods and may become an 
important alternative to traditional client-server network architectures for 
knowledge sharing within enterprises. This paper reviews and synthesizes the 
relevant computer science and economics literatures as they relate to P2P 
networks, and raises important questions for researchers interested in studying 
the behavior of these networks from the perspective of the economics of 
information technology. 
With regard to the economic characteristics of these networks, we show 
that while the characteristics of services provided over P2P networks are similar 
to public goods and club goods, they have many important differences and hence 
there is a need for new theoretical models as well as empirical and experimental 
analysis to understand P2P user behavior. We then identify several important 
areas for study with regard to the economics of P2P networks and review recent 
academic papers in each area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks allow a 
distributed community of users to share 
resources in the form of information, digital 
content, storage space, or processing capacity. 
The novel aspect of these networks is that, in 
contrast to client-server networks where all 
network content is located in a central 
location, P2P resources are located in and 
provided by computers at the edge of the 
network (a.k.a. “peers”). 
It is interesting to note that while they 
are perceived to be a recent phenomenon, P2P 
networks have their origins in many of the 
early Internet applications and architectures. 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), which was 
developed in the late 1980s, was one of the 
first P2P services on the Internet. IRC allowed 
for the transmission of text messages, and later 
digital content, directly between groups of 
network users. Likewise, the Domain Name 
System, and Usenet bulletin boards exhibit 
elements of P2P design. Thus, it can be argued 
that the P2P design concept is embedded in 
many of the original Internet protocols and 
applications (Minar and Hedlund 2001). 
Still, the widespread popularization of 
P2P at the consumer level can be traced to the 
release of the Napster file-sharing program in 
May 1999. Napster was developed in a matter 
of months by Shawn Fanning, then a 
Northeastern University student. Initially 
distributed to 30 friends, the program grew to 
25 million users worldwide within its first 12 
months of operation (Strahilevitz 2002). 
In all P2P file-sharing networks, the 
content resides with the network users. The 
only difference between the architecture of 
these networks is the nature of the catalog of 
this content. In Napster and OpenNap (an open 
source version of the Napster protocol) the 
catalog of content is centralized in a single 
server or a set of mirrored servers to 
accomplish load balancing (Asvanund, Clay, 
Krishnan, and Smith 2003). Users who logged 
into the Napster network would automatically 
upload a list of the content they were sharing 
to a mirrored set of central content databases 
owned by Napster. 
Users who wanted to access content on 
the network would issue a query against this 
central database that would then point them to 
a list of peers who had the content on their 
computer. The Napster program at the peer 
initiating the search would then automatically 
issue a ping message to each of the peers in the 
list of search results to determine the level of 
congestion on the network and at the peer. The 
Napster client would then display the search 
results in a tabular format with the names of 
the files returned by the search along with the 
file size and length, bitrate and encoding 
frequency, and the name of the user along with 
the user’s self-reported connection speed and 
ping time (Figure 1). 
The searching peer could then decide 
which of these search results they were 
interested in accessing, and initiate a file 
download directly from the peer who provided 
the content. This architecture gave users a high 
degree of visibility to content on the network 
and thus improved the ease of user search. 
However, it also introduced a vulnerability to 
the network: The network ceased to function if 
the central servers were shutdown, as a judge 
ordered Napster to do following a lawsuit filed 
by the Recording Industry Association of 
American (RIAA). 
Many networks that have emerged 
following Napster’s demise have adopted a 
decentralized or hybrid catalog of content to 
reduce both legal and technical risks from the 
loss of the central server and to reduce the 
monetary investment required to operate the 
network by distributing database management 
CONTRIBUTION 
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characteristics of these networks and compare 
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Figure 1: Napster Search Results 
 
responsibilities to the individual peers  
(Asvanund, Clay, Krishnan, and Smith 2003). 
Gnutella 0.4, Gnutella 0.6, and Kazaa are 
notable examples of such networks. 
The Gnutella 0.4 protocol features a 
distributed catalog of files. To connect to the 
network, a Gnutella peer would establish 
simultaneous connections to approximately 3 
other peers on the network. These peers would 
also maintain simultaneous connections to 
other peers. In this mesh architecture, peers 
maintain a list of their own files. A peer can 
issue a search to its neighbors with a time-to-
live (TTL) definition. This search will be 
forwarded up to the number of times defined 
by the TTL field (typically 7). If a peer 
receiving the search message has the requested 
content, they will send a reply back through 
the chain to the originating peer. The 
advantage of this architecture is that Gnutella 
0.4 networks do not have a central point of 
vulnerability.  
However, a disadvantage of this 
architecture is that the finite TTL field on 
query packets limits the size of the network 
that a peer is able to access. The Gnutella 0.4 
protocol limits the number of peers that can be 
reached by a query to 10,000 regardless of the 
size of the network (Kirk 2003). This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that queries are 
passed among peers who may have 
significantly limited bandwidth (for example, 
modem users). These bandwidth limits result 
in large numbers of dropped packets and in 
practice limit the effective reach of a Gnutella 
0.4 query to between 5,000 and 8,000 peers. 
The Gnutella 0.6 and Kazaa protocols 
adopt a hybrid architectural design that relaxes 
some of these scalability problems. In each of 
these networks a small set of computers are 
selected to maintain local content databases. In 
Gnutella 0.6 these are called ultrapeers and in 
Kazaa they are called supernodes. In both 
cases peers on the network indicate their 
willingness to serve as local content databases 
and are selected for this task by the network 
protocol. Ultrapeers and supernodes are 
selected from the pool of available peers based 
on their available bandwidth resources and 
tenure on the network (a proxy for stability). 
Other peers connect directly to these ultrapeers 
and upload their list of content as in the 
Napster protocol. The ultrapeers are then 
interconnected in much the same way as peers 
on a Gnutella 0.4 network. Searches for 
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content are first issued to the ultrapeer and 
then these queries propagate to other 
interconnected ultrapeers using the same TTL 
field discussed above. Compared to Gnutella 
0.4’s decentralized architecture, these 
networks have the advantage of increased 
content visibility and enable more efficient 
search. Still it is important to note that inter-
ultrapeer connections are limited by the TTL 
field in Gnutella 0.6 and thus the effective size 
of a user’s local network is still limited versus 
a centralized architecture. Compared to 
Napster’s centralized architecture, shutdown 
risks are minimized because new ultrapeers 
can be selected if some existing ultrapeers are 
disabled. More details on both the Gnutella 0.4 
and Gnutella 0.6 protocols are available in 
Kirk (2003). 
File sharing using these and similar 
networks has been called the “killer app” of 
P2P, and rightly so. The Yankee group 
estimates that consumers swapped over 5 
billion music files over P2P networks in 2001 
(Dignan 2002). A recent study by Ipsos-Reid 
finds that 23% of the American population 
over age the age of 12 has downloaded MP3s 
over the Internet (Ipsos-Reid 2002). This 
proportion is likely to be much higher among 
the 12-21 year-old demographic critical to the 
music and movie industries. In 2000, a Gartner 
study found that Napster accounted for up to 
75% of the traffic on some university LANs 
(Shuchman 2000). More recently, the March 
2002 shutdown of the Morpheus P2P network 
resulted in a 50% drop in the number of 
packets sent on Carnegie Mellon’s wireless 
network (Sirbu 2002). 
However, while P2P file sharing 
networks are among the most popular 
applications of P2P technology, P2P 
technology is also gaining adoption in a 
variety of other arenas. For example, P2P 
networks are being used for distributed 
computing (e.g., SETI@Home), enterprise 
knowledge sharing (e.g., Bad Blue), and user 
collaboration (e.g., Groove Networks). 
Further, while most of the previous examples 
of consumer P2P networks have a high 
proportion of copyrighted content, there is no 
reason that Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
cannot be incorporated into such P2P 
networks. For example, the subscription-based 
Napster service launched in early 2002 used 
DRM technology within its P2P architecture to 
protect copyright holders. Subsequently, 
Altnet has proposed a similar scheme as an 
overlay to the Kazaa network. 
A great deal of research has analyzed 
the technical features of these networks, 
particularly on improving the efficiency of 
P2P indexing schemes (e.g., Ratnasamy, 
Francis, Handley, Karp, and Shenker 2001; 
Stoica, Morris, Karger, Kaashoek, and 
Balakrishnan 2001), content caching schemes 
(e.g., Druschel and Rowstrown 2001; 
Bhattacharjee, Chawathe, Gopalakrishnan, 
Keleher, and Silaghi 2003), and architectural 
designs (e.g., Kirk 2003; Sripanidkulchai, 
Maggs, and Zhang 2003). Until recently little 
research has been conducted regarding the 
economic characteristics of P2P networks and 
how these economic characteristics might 
impact their design and operation. The 
remainder of this paper seeks to highlight this 
important area of P2P and proceeds as follows. 
In section 2, we analyze the economic 
characteristics of peer-to-peer networks 
focusing on comparing the services offered 
over peer-to-peer networks to traditional 
private, public, and club goods. In section 3, 
we identify important areas of research 
integrating an economic perspective into the 
analysis of P2P networks and review selected 
recent papers in each area. In section 4, we 
conclude and discuss fruitful areas for future 
economic research relating to peer-to-peer 
networks. 
UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF 
P2P NETWORKS 
While P2P networks vary in their 
architectural design, files are always 
transferred directly between the computers of 
peers connected to the network. Further, once 
these files have been delivered the user 
downloading the file, by default, becomes a 
provider of that content. Thus, in an ideal case 
the provision of content on the network will 
scale to match the level of demand for the 
content. To the extent this holds, P2P networks 
share some of the characteristics of public 
goods and club goods (Asvanund, Clay, 
Krishnan, and Smith 2003).  
Public goods are goods that have the 
characteristics of non-excludability in supply 
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and non-rivalry in demand (Hardin 1968). 
Non-excludability in supply means that 
individuals can’t be excluded from consuming 
the product — if the product is provided to one 
person in a community it must be provided to 
everyone. Non-rivalry in demand means that 
one user’s consumption of a product does not 
diminish another user’s value of that product. 
Typical examples of public goods include 
clean air, national defense, and public radio 
and television broadcasts. 
In contrast to public goods, club goods 
are goods that are excludable in supply but 
non-rival in demand. Thus, the number of 
people with access to the good can be limited, 
but contingent on having access to the good, 
the consumption of the good by one user does 
not reduce the utility of other users. Cable and 
satellite television broadcasts and private 
swimming pools are typical examples of club 
goods. 
P2P networks share some of the 
economic properties of public and club goods. 
In the ideal case, P2P networks will 
approximate both non-excludability in supply 
and non-rivalry in demand. Non-excludability 
is accomplished because network resources are 
typically provided to all members of the 
network equally. Non-rivalry is accomplished 
because, given that a downloading user shares 
the content they download, the net number of 
opportunities to download will not decrease 
for other users on the network.  
However, this non-rivalry property will 
not hold if some network users consume 
network resources but do not share their 
content in return. These users are commonly 
known as free-riders and free-riding is a 
common characteristic of P2P networks. For 
example, Adar and Huberman (2000) observe 
that 66% of Gnutella 0.4 users were free-riding 
in August 2000. Similarly, Asvanund, 
Krishnan, Smith, and Telang (2003) observe 
that 42% of Gnutella 0.6 users were free-riding 
in September 2002. In the presence of free-
riding, P2P networks will exhibit levels of 
rivalry — the consumption of network 
resources by a free-riding user will diminish 
the level of utility offered by the network to 
other users. This level of rivalry, combined 
with the non-excludability of network 
resources discussed above distinguishes 
resources provided by P2P networks from 
either public goods or club goods. 
Asvanund, Clay, Krishnan, and Smith 
(2003) identify several other differences 
between resources provided over P2P 
networks and other typical public and club 
goods. First, they note that the size of the 
offering of a public or club good is typically 
discrete and fixed. A swimming pool, for 
example, has a fixed size. In contrast, the size 
of the offering of P2P goods is typically 
relatively continuous and variable because it is 
a function of the type of content shared by 
network users and the number of users who 
share. A second difference noted by the 
authors is that in public or club goods settings 
the default choice of users is typically non-
contribution, whereas in most P2P client 
programs contribution is enabled by default. 
Strahilevitz (2002) notes that this is an 
important factor in establishing community 
norms around sharing. A third difference is 
that contribution in P2P networks is linked to 
consumption and is in the form of network 
resources whereas in typical public and club 
goods environments contribution is separate 
from consumption and is in the form of a 
monetary payment. This linkage between the 
consumption and provision of P2P network 
resources has implications for the formation 
and sustainability of P2P networks as shown 
by Krishnan, Smith, Tang, and Telang (2003). 
In spite of these differences between 
public and club goods and P2P network 
resources, there are important similarities 
between the provision of these goods. For 
example, an important observation from the 
public goods literature that seems to 
extrapolate to P2P networks is the inability of 
individually rational behavior to bring about 
socially optimal outcomes. In typical 
economic models, individual economic actors 
will only consider their private utility when 
making consumption and provision decisions 
— they will not consider the impact (a.k.a. the 
externality) this decision will impose on other 
community members. Because of this, in the 
absence of outside incentives, the self-
interested consumption of public goods may 
deplete the overall public utility. This is 
popularity known as the “tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin 1968). Common examples 
of such “tragedies” include over-grazing by 
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farmers using public lands and over-fishing of 
public waters. 
In the context of P2P networks similar 
situations are observed relating to both over-
consumption and under-provision of 
community resources. Over-consumption of 
network resources might occur because, when 
deciding whether to initiate a download from 
the network, P2P users may only consider their 
private utility of initiating that download and 
not the congestion this download will impose 
on other network users. Likewise, under-
provision might occur because, when deciding 
whether to share, users may only consider their 
private costs of sharing (e.g., reduced 
bandwidth) and not the benefits their sharing 
provides to other network users. This will lead 
to levels of free-riding above the optimal level 
for the community.1 Indeed, as noted above, 
most P2P networks exhibit high levels of free-
riding. These high levels of free-riding led 
Adar and Huberman (2000) to observe “free-
riding leads to degradation of the system 
performance…if this trend continues copyright 
issues might become moot compared to the 
possible collapse of such systems.” 
Will the economic characteristics of 
resource provision on P2P networks lead to the 
ultimate collapse of such systems? Can user 
incentives be designed into such systems to 
forestall such a collapse? How can trust be 
enhanced among a set of distributed self-
interested peers? What are the implications of 
P2P systems on the balance between the rights 
of copyright holders, network entrepreneurs, 
and users? We raise these and related areas for 
research in the next section. We also review 
selected recent papers in each area with a focus 
on selected papers presented at the 2003 
Workshop on the Economics of P2P Networks 
at the University of California at Berkeley.2 
                                                 
1 In the case of downloads that involve copyrighted 
material, one could also argue that the provider or 
downloader of the content might only consider their 
private utility from provision or consumption and 
not the externality this action would impose on 
content producers. 
2 More information is available on this conference 
at the conference website: 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/
p2pecon/ 
ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS OF P2P 
NETWORKS 
Incentives 
One obvious question raised by the 
previous section is how user behavior will 
respond to the economic characteristics of P2P 
networks and how can network designers 
influence this behavior through incentive 
mechanisms. This question is particularly 
important in light of recent observations of the 
importance of incentive alignment for 
Information Technology design (Ba, Stallaert, 
and Whinston 2001). One obvious area where 
economic incentives find application in P2P 
networks is controlling free-riding behavior on 
the part of users. 
As noted above, free-riding behavior 
occurs when a user consumes network 
resources without providing any resources in 
return, and this situation may deteriorate in 
larger P2P networks where social norms are 
likely to be weakened (Olson 1968). A variety 
of solutions have been proposed to reduce the 
problem of free-riding on P2P networks. The 
most common proposal follows a pricing 
model, where incentive compatibility is 
achieved by pricing a scarce network resource 
(e.g., MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995; Wang, 
Peha, and Sirbu 1996). In the spirit of pricing 
network resources, Golle Leyton-Brown, and 
Moronov (2001) propose to charge for the use 
of P2P network capacity through a system of 
micro-payments. Similarly, Chandan and 
Hogenborn (2001) analyze the use of micro-
payments in the context of wireless P2P 
networks and find that micro-payments may be 
able to provide an incentive compatible 
solution to the free-riding problem. 
However, it is also interesting to note 
that direct payments between peers may be 
impractical in many common P2P 
implementations. For example, it is difficult to 
imagine transfer payments between users of a 
knowledge sharing P2P network with an 
enterprise. Likewise, in many consumer P2P 
networks direct micro-payments will be 
difficult to implement because of the 
anonymous nature of network usage. In these 
settings it will be particularly important to 
develop non-priced incentives to encourage 
efficient behavior on the part of P2P users. 
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Some examples of non-priced incentives could 
include delay times (e.g., providing priority 
queuing to users to share more content with 
the network), network membership (e.g., 
threatening to remove non-sharing members 
from the network), or peer ratings of content 
providers. Krishnan, Smith, Tang, and Telang 
(2003) provide an example of such an 
approach. Strikingly, their model finds that it 
may not be socially optimal for all users to 
share depending on the cost an individual user 
incurs when sharing and the value that their 
sharing would provide to the remainder of the 
peers on the network. They use quality-of-
service as a tuning parameter to induce the 
optimal amount of sharing. 
Several authors have proposed similar 
non-priced mechanisms for sharing based on 
implicit or explicit reciprocity among users. 
For example Vishnumurthy, Chandrakumar, 
and Sirer (2003) propose KARMA, a system 
for tracking both user’s contribution to and 
consumption of network resources. Each user 
receives a particular “karma” score, increasing 
in contribution and decreasing in consumption 
of network resources, which governs their 
future consumption of network resources. 
Similarly, Kamvar, Yang, and Garcia-Molina 
(2003) propose a similar scheme based on the 
possibility that self-interested peers will not 
forward query requests from other peers. In 
their network, peers “buy and sell” the right to 
respond to queries from other network users. 
Ranganathan, Ripeanu, Sarin, and Foster 
(2003) argue that sharing in P2P networks is 
akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem such 
that non-sharing is the only dominant outcome. 
They then argue that if the game is extended to 
a multi person setting, mechanisms can be 
developed to improve the level of sharing in 
the network. In both these mechanisms, higher 
reputation leads to better quality of service, 
which in turn encourages sharing.  
User Behavior and Motivation 
A closely related area of inquiry 
concerns what motivates users to share on P2P 
networks. Is it individually rational behavior? 
Altruism? Some combination of the two? The 
analysis of user behavior is a fruitful area of 
research, particularly given the importance of 
incentive design for efficient network design. 
Several recent papers seek to 
understand and explain user motivations when 
contributing to P2P networks. Gu and 
Jarvenpaa (2003) provide an empirical study 
of sharing behavior among users on P2P 
technical support forums. They argue that 
sharing in these settings is most consistent 
with altruistic motivations. Feldman Lai, 
Chuang, and Stoica (2003) on the other hand 
argue that sharing does not impose as much 
cost as users think in a broadband symmetric 
network. But in other cases when upload and 
download speeds are different (like ADSL), 
sharing can lead to some latency. They also 
show that prioritizing the TCP traffic could 
potentially lead to better network performance 
in some cases. Finally, Strahilevitz (2002) 
argues that sharing occurs in network due to 
“charismatic code” — the intentional 
perception given to network users that sharing 
is a common and normal practice in the 
network. 
Reputation and Trust 
The development of systems to track 
the reliability or consistency of a peer’s 
contribution to other members of the network 
is also closely related to the development of 
incentive systems for P2P networks. Such 
systems build on the incentive schemes 
mentioned above which track a user’s 
contribution in the present period (e.g., 
Krishnan, Smith, Tang, and Telang 2003), by 
tracking a user’s contribution over a longer 
time period.  
P2P reputation systems are closely 
related to the efforts of online communities, 
such as eBay, to develop incentive-compatible 
systems for rating the performance of a 
distributed set of users (see Dellarocas 2003 
for a review of this literature). However, the 
design of reputation systems for P2P networks 
is complicated by two factors. First, the 
distributed and intermediated nature of P2P 
network interactions makes it easy for users to 
conceal or change their identity. Second, in 
some fully distributed applications, the 
administration of the rating system must also 
be distributed throughout the network, making 
it vulnerable to coordinated gaming strategies. 
Dutta, Goel, Govindan, and Zhang (2003) and 
Shneidman and Parkes (2003) discuss in more 
detail the difficulties associated with fully 
distributed reputation networks. 
Ramayya Krishnan, Michael Smith, and Rahul Telang 
 38 
With regard to such systems, Lai, 
Feldman, Stoica, and Chuang (2003) study the 
evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (EPD). Since 
EPD characterizes cooperation that requires 
repetition and reputation, it needs to be 
modified in the context of P2P networks 
because of the lack of repeat interaction among 
the peers and the easy acquisition of 
pseudonyms.  They introduce the concept of 
“private” history and “shared” history as a way 
to encourage sharing. Shared history is a 
centralized pool where peers’ past behavior is 
noted and services are provided according to 
their reputation.  
Other work in this domain includes 
Moreton and Twigg (2003) who compare 
reputation mechanisms with payment 
mechanisms and then argue that “stamp 
trading” mechanisms capture the essence of 
both mechanisms quite well. Cohen (2003) on 
the other hand argues that a “tit for tat” 
treatment leads to a significant improvement 
and robustness in a P2P network. He 
demonstrates the practical implementation of 
this mechanism in the context of the 
BitTorrent P2P network. Kung and Wu (2003) 
combine elements of incentive design with 
persistent trust ratings by proposing an 
admission control system that provides quality 
of service differentiation to users based on a 
distributed mechanism that tracks user 
reputations. Woodard and Parkes (2003) 
employ mechanism design techniques in the 
context of network formation. They analyze 
how a network of distributed, self-interested 
peers might be able to form.  
Reputation and trust mechanisms can 
also help to protect against a coordinated 
attack by an outside adversary. For example, 
the RIAA and its member organizations have 
recently initiated several attacks against P2P 
networks by flooding the network with “fake” 
files labeled to appear as though it were real 
content (the economics of this strategy is 
discussed in more detail below). The first 
documented case of the strategic distribution 
of fake files on a P2P network was in 
September 2000 by the rock group Bare Naked 
Ladies (Wake 2000). This was a small effort 
and only targeted the Napster network. In May 
2002, the practice was imitated on a larger 
scale for the release of Eminem’s “The 
Eminem Show” album (Avery 2002). 
Strahilevitz (2002) notes that this practice 
became widespread in June 2002 with three of 
the major record labels adopting the practice 
for many of their artists. 
Such an attack is facilitated in a 
distributed network because it is difficult to 
tell whether an individual offering a file is a 
genuine sharer or an adversary posing as a 
legitimate sharer. Rosenthal, Roussopoulos, 
Maniatis, and Baker (2003) discuss 
mechanisms to protect against coordinated 
attacks in the context of protecting information 
goods for library services. 
Intellectual Property 
The strategy of the RIAA is motivated 
by their legitimate desire to protect their 
intellectual property from unauthorized 
sharing. However, this legitimate effort to 
protect intellectual property can, in some 
cases, collide with the interests and rights of 
entrepreneurs attempting to develop novel 
information sharing networks, individuals 
exercising fair use rights associated with 
legitimately purchased materials, and network 
operators seeking to protect the privacy of 
their users.  
Thus, the issue of liability, privacy and 
intellectual property rights on these networks 
is a promising area of research that has 
academic, policy and commercial implications. 
From an academic perspective, a natural 
question is: how much of an impact do P2P 
networks have on sales of associated 
information goods? Liebowitz (2001) argued 
that early data suggested that the impact of 
P2P networks on record industry sales was 
minimal. Hui and Png (2002) have a similar 
finding, arguing that P2P networks had 
significant promotional value for record 
companies, which militated against losses. 
However, using more recent data, Liebowitz 
(2003) finds that the impact may be a 
significant cause of the recent downturn in 
record sales. 
From a policy perspective, how should 
the interests of artists and copyright creators be 
balanced against the interests of network users 
and entrepreneurs designing new distribution 
mechanisms for information goods? From the 
perspective of commercial industries, is it 
possible to use P2P networks as a promotional 
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channel while simultaneously reducing 
commercial risk from piracy as argued by Hui 
and Png (2002) and what form would such a 
network take? 
Another interesting commercial 
question concerns the optimal response of 
copyright holders to the threat of piracy. 
Recently, Varian (2003) studies the social cost 
of sharing and shows that when sharing is 
possible and a monopolist can observe it then 
generally it can price the product such that it 
leads to an inefficient outcome and low overall 
welfare.  
It is also possible to consider legal and 
strategic options available to copyright holders 
to make participation in P2P network less 
attractive for users. In a typical scenario, a 
user’s net utility from consuming a product is 
U - p- sc where U is the utility of the product, 
p is the price of the product, and sc is the 
search cost associated with obtaining the 
product. In the case of MP3 file sharing for a 
record company’s file sharing site to yield 
higher utility to a potential customer than 
using a copyright-infringing site the record 
company would need Ur - pr – scr > Up - scp 
where the price to use the copyright-infringing 
site is assumed to be 0. What is interesting for 
the record companies is that, unlike in a typical 
situation where they can only control their own 
utility, price, and search cost, in the case of 
MP3 file sharing networks they can also 
influence the utility and search cost of the 
competing network. One way copyright 
holders can search costs is by flooding the 
network with fake files and thereby increasing 
user’s search costs for their desired content 
(see Segal 2002 for example). In such a 
scenario, the record company would register 
numerous peers on the copyright-infringing 
site each with a set of MP3s that use the same 
naming structure as popular music content, but 
which contain no usable content.3 The end 
result should be to increase the number of files 
a user must download before they find the 
“real” content they were looking for. By 
lowering the utility and increasing the search 
costs of their competitors’ file sharing 
networks, the record company’s web sites will 
                                                 
3 The companies MediaDefender and Vidius both 
advertise software product to make this process 
easier for the record companies. 
have more flexibility in setting the utility level 
of their content (e.g., by restricting the legal 
uses of the files) and their prices. Copyright 
holders can also threaten users with fines or 
lawsuits for illegally sharing and downloading 
copyrighted content. This raises the implicit 
cost of users to share content, thereby 
increasing free-riding, and thus reducing the 
utility of the network by reducing network 
performance and scalability (Asvanund, Clay, 
Krishnan, Smith 2003). This strategy may 
have been responsible for a 15% drop in week-
to-week file-sharing traffic for the week 
ending July 6, 2003 following well-publicized 
lawsuits against prominent file-sharers on the 
Kazaa network (Reuters 2003). 
Another interesting commercial 
question concerns the interests of Internet 
service providers who provide benefit to their 
users through the provision of P2P network 
services, but who also incur significant costs 
through the consumption of scarce bandwidth 
by P2P traffic. Many colleges and universities 
have found that P2P traffic makes up more 
than 50% of traffic on their links to the 
Internet. Similarly, a report by Sandvine.com 
found that P2P packets made up 60% of the 
traffic on major Internet backbone 
connections. These problems are exacerbated 
by the fact that connections in many popular 
P2P networks are not optimized for either 
similarity in user interests or similarity in user 
locations with respect to the network topology. 
This can result in large transit fees being borne 
by the ISP seeking to provide access to P2P 
applications. A natural response to these high 
bandwidth requirements, and one adopted by 
several Universities, is to limit the quality of 
service provided to P2P packets passing 
through the organization’s link to the Internet 
with the intention of getting users to limit their 
use of P2P. A more draconian approach is to 
block all packets to and from P2P network 
users. However, some alternate approaches are 
emerging. For example, Asvanund, Krishnan, 
Smith, and Telang (2003) propose economic 
models to encourage the dynamic formation of 
clubs in P2P networks based on common 
interests, similar provision of resources, and 
proximity with regard to network location. 
Similarly, Singh, Ramabhadran, Baboescu, 
and Snoren (2003) propose conditions under 
which Internet Service Providers would benefit 
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from sponsoring their own ultrapeers for the 
provision of P2P network resources. 
DISCUSSION 
It is evident from the growth of P2P 
networks in last 2-3 years that they are 
becoming important tool for content sharing 
and distribution. While the popularity of these 
networks has been mainly from consumer P2P 
file sharing, many organizations have been 
using these networks for as knowledge 
management tools to share information across 
the enterprise. 
A review of the recent literature on P2P 
networks suggests that while technical 
developments have kept pace with the growth 
of these networks, the economic and social 
analysis of these networks is still in a nascent 
stage. Understanding P2P network operation 
from the perspective of the economic 
characteristics of content provision and user 
behavior will be critical to developing 
protocols and systems to ensure the efficient 
operation of these networks. 
Public and club goods provide a useful 
starting point for the economic analysis of P2P 
networks. P2P networks share many 
characteristics with public and club goods, but 
differ from these goods in important ways. 
Since the literature on public goods is quite 
extensive, it allows researchers to extrapolate 
some of the results from this literature. But we 
note that not all results are equally applicable. 
Since these goods are essentially a different 
class of product, we need to understand the 
mechanism of these networks carefully before 
applying these results. In many cases, we need 
different models to understand user behavior.  
Another important observation we have 
noted is the existence of extensive free-riding 
on these networks and its social and economic 
implication. Free-riding may significantly 
reduce the performance of P2P networks. A 
standard result in the economic literature is 
that larger groups lead to more free-riding. But 
at the same time, altruism could significantly 
mitigate these effects in the context of P2P 
networks. As these networks continue to grow, 
we need new theoretical models as well as 
experimental and empirical data to understand 
user behavior.  
An emerging body of research seeks to 
integrate economics into the study of P2P 
networks. Significant questions addressed in 
this research include the role of incentives in 
improving network performance, the 
motivations of users who consume and provide 
resources in P2P networks, the application of 
trust and recommendation mechanisms to the 
unique environments present in P2P networks, 
and the balance between the rights of 
copyright holders, entrepreneurs, and 
consumers. It will be important for future 
researcher to pursue these and other relevant 
questions in the coming years. 
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